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Abstract 
How do authoritarian elections affect voters’ attitudes toward the regime and their 
support for democracy? Drawing upon the case of village elections in China, this 
paper argues that elections may have two simultaneous effects on voters’ political 
attitudes. First, free and fair elections tend to elevate ordinary citizens’ confidence in 
the government. Second, elections also provide voters with a platform to exercise 
political rights and accumulate democratic experience through participation, which in 
turn triggers greater demand for further empowerment. Using data from a two-round 
nationwide survey conducted in 114 villages, the empirical analysis of the paper 
confirms both effects. One implication of these findings is that authoritarian elections 
may simultaneously strengthen mass support for the regime and trigger greater public 
demand for further democratization.  
 
																																								 																				
1 I am grateful to Dennis Chong, Joseph Fewsmith, Kenneth Janda, Georgia Kernell, Pierre 
Landry, Mingxing Liu, Benjamin Page, Will Reno, Jason Seawright, Victor Shih and Travis 
Warner for their comments and suggestions on earlier versions of the paper. I also thank Ran 
Tao at Renmin University of China for generously sharing his original survey data and for his 
encouragement of this research. Of course, all mistakes are mine. 
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Although elections have long been regarded as the hallmark of democracy, a large and 
increasing number of authoritarian states also hold competitive presidential, 
legislative and/or sub-national elections.1 Scholars disagree about the role of 
elections in authoritarian regimes.2 Conventional wisdom tends to view elections as 
incompatible with authoritarian regimes since they undermine such regime’s 
ideological foundation, liberalize organized opposition, and trigger greater popular 
demand for political rights.3 In contrast, a recent literature on competitive 
authoritarianism begins to emphasize the regime-stabilizing effects of elections. For 
example, some scholars argue that regular and relatively free elections may enable 
regime leaders to identify potential oppositions and credibly share office spoils among 
members of the ruling coalition.4 Others focus more on legislative elections and view 
them as a useful institutional tool to co-opt powerful opposition groups.5 
Despite these fruitful achievements, existing studies on both sides of the 
debate tend to focus on the interaction between electoral institutions and political 
																																								 																				
1 This paper downplays the conceptual distinction among various kinds of authoritarian regimes. This 
could be an innocuous simplification since this research does not touch upon the differences in either 
organizational structure or elite relationship among types of authoritarian regimes. 
2 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "The Rise of Ccompetitive Authoritarianism," Journal of 
Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002); Beatriz Magaloni, "The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of 
Authoritarian Rule," American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 3 (2010); Andreas Schedler, "The 
Menu of Manipulation," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002). 
3 Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, Transitions from 
authoritarian rule : prospects for democracy  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); 
Minxin Pei, "How will China democratize?," Journal of Democracy 18, no. 3 (2007). 
4 Gary Cox, "Authoritarian elections and leadership succession, 1975-2000," Working Paper (2007); 
Barbara Geddes, "Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?," Working Paper (2006); 
Beatriz Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico  (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Beatriz Magaloni, "Credible Power-Sharing and the 
Longevity of Authoritarian Rule," Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 4-5 (2008). 
5 Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Coperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships," 
Economics & Politics 18, no. 1 (2006); Joseph Wright, "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How 
Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment," American Journal of Political Science 52, no. 
2 (2008). 
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elites while overlooking the potential impact of elections on ordinary citizens’ 
political attitudes. In particular, it remains unclear whether elections would increase 
regime legitimacy in the eyes of voters or trigger greater social demand for further 
empowerment and regime change. Research based on democratic countries has 
associated fair and transparent elections with strong public support for both the 
elected government and the democratic institution in general.6 However, little 
evidence exists about whether the same logic holds for non-democratic regimes, in 
which elections are set up by governments that do not conform to democratic 
principles in many respects. Given the potential contradiction between government 
support and preference for democracy, it is theoretically intriguing to ask how 
elections affect public opinions in an authoritarian context.7 
This paper attempts to fill in this lacuna in the literature by studying 
authoritarian elections from a public opinion perspective. More specifically, it aims to 
explore whether and how elections affect ordinary voters’ trust in the government and 
their support for democracy. The analysis focuses on these two political attitudes 
because of their widely recognized importance in the dynamic of modern regimes. 
Under established or transitioning democracies, confidence in the elected government 
and public support for democratic institutions are both crucial to the process of 
																																								 																				
6 Sarah Birch, "Electoral institutions and popular confidence in electoral processes: A cross-national 
analysis," Electoral Studies 27, no. 2 (2008). Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, "The Politics 
and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies," British 
Journal of Political Science 25, no. 4 (1995). 
7 Lianjiang Li, "Distrust in Government Leaders, Demand for Leadership Change, and Preference for 
Popular Elections in Rural China," Political Behavior (2010). 
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political legitimization and democratic consolidation.8 The two political attitudes are 
also important for non-democratic regimes. On the one hand, the lack of public 
confidence in the ruling regime may trigger individual and collective contentious 
behaviors thereby increasing the risk of regime breakdown, as illustrated by the 
collapse of East European communist regimes in early 1990s and the more recent 
political turmoil in the Middle East. This being the case, measures that are able to 
boost public confidence in government should be conducive to the longevity of the 
authoritarian rule. From another perspective, modernization theory suggests that the 
accumulation of social support for representative institutions may lead to a 
pro-democratic political culture, which increases people’s psychological and 
behavioral tendency to pursue political rights and liberty and in the long run 
destabilizes the authoritarian rule.9  
I propose two hypothesized effects of authoritarian elections, namely “trust 
enhancing effect” and “democratic training effect”, on citizens' political attitudes. 
More specifically, “trust enhancing effect” means that by setting up relatively free and 
fair elections, authoritarian governments can gain greater public confidence, while 
																																								 																				
8 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The civic culture; political attitudes and democracy in five 
nations  (Princeton, N.J.,: Princeton University Press, 1963). Marc J. Hetherington, "The Political 
Relevance of Political Trust," The American Political Science Review 92, no. 4 (1998); Marc J. 
Hetherington, Why trust matters : declining political trust and the demise of American liberalism  
(Princeton, NJ ; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005). Samuel P. Huntington, The third wave : 
democratization in the late twentieth century  (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Pamela 
Waldron-Moore, "Eastern Europe at the Crossroads of Democratic Transition," Comparative Political 
Studies 32, no. 1 (1999). 
9 Lawrence E. Harrison, Who prospers? : how cultural values shape economic and political success  
(New York, NY: Basic Books, 1992); Huntington, The third wave : democratization in the late 
twentieth century; Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959); 
Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart, "The Role of Ordinary People in Democratization," Journal of 
Democracy 19, no. 1 (2008). 
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“democratic training effect” argues that elections also provide voters with a platform 
to accumulate democratic experience through participation, which in turn increases 
their democratic consciousness and demand for further improvement in political rights. 
To test these arguments, I draw on the case of village elections in China. Empirical 
analysis based on a nationwide survey confirms both effects, suggesting that 
authoritarian elections do not affect state-society relations and regime stability in a 
unidirectional way; rather, elections may simultaneously consolidate the authoritarian 
rule and trigger greater public demand for further democratization of the regime.  
The paper also contributes the existing discussion on the development of 
grassroots democracy in China. Survey-based studies have established that village 
elections are useful to induce accountability of village officials and improve village 
governance.10 However, whether elections also shape voters’ attitudes to 
governments that set up and control these elections remains an unsolved puzzle. As 
far as the political impacts of these elections are concerned, it is argued that they have 
contributed to the improvement of civil consciousness and political efficacy among 
rural residents.11 Do these changes in political awareness also result in stronger 
support for further democratization of the regime? By answering these questions, this 
																																								 																				
10 Melanie Manion, "The Electoral Connection in the Chinese Countryside," The American Political 
Science Review 90, no. 4 (1996); Melanie Manion, "Democracy, Community, Trust: The Impact of 
Elections in Rural China," Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 3 (2006). John J. Kennedy, Scott 
Rozelle, and Yaojiang Shi, "Elected Leaders and Collective Land: Farmers' Evaluation of Village 
Leaders' Performance in Rural China," Journal of Chinese Political Science 9, no. 1 (2004); Yan Shen 
and Yang Yao, "Does grassroots democracy reduce income inequality in China?," Journal of Public 
Economics 92, no. 10-11 (2008). For a different view, see Lily L. Tsai, Accountability without 
democracy : solidary groups and public goods provision in rural China  (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
11 Kevin J. O'Brien, "Villagers, Elections, and Citizenship in Contemporary China," Modern China 27, 
no. 4 (2001); Lianjiang Li, "The Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China," Asian Survey 43, 
no. 4 (2003). 
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paper also deepens our understanding of the village elections in China and their 
potential political consequences.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: The next section briefly introduces 
village elections in China. Then following the existing literature on electoral 
authoritarianism, I propose two hypotheses regarding the impacts of elections on 
voters’ political trust and support for democracy. Section four describes the survey 
data, the coding rule for key variables and the specification of the statistical model. 
Then I report and interpret the major findings, followed by a concluding remark. 
The Institution of Village Elections in China 
Village elections in China first emerged in early 1980s, immediately after the 
commencement of economic reform in the rural area. The following two decades have 
witnessed the development of this village-level democratic institution, as elected 
villagers’ committees gradually replaced the appointed village governments and 
became the locus of power in a majority of villages across the country. A typical 
villagers’ committee is composed of three to five officials, normally a chair, several 
deputy chairs and an accountant. The passage of the Organic Law of Villagers’ 
Committees in 1998 was a milestone in the history of village elections. The law for 
the first time required that officials in a villagers’ committee must be elected through 
competitive elections every three years. It also stipulated that each adult individual in 
the village should have the right to vote, to nominate others and to be nominated as 
candidates. Since then the development of grassroots democratic institutions in rural 
China seems to have become consolidated and irreversible. 
6 
	
  Despite the absence of party competition, Chinese village elections embrace 
limited but genuine contestation for offices. They are more than the “window-dressing” 
exercise commonly existing in elections held by communist states. The number of 
candidates must exceed the number of seats available. Candidates, even if they are 
Party members and/or sponsored by the local authority, lose elections routinely, 
leading to frequent alternations of village leadership. Mobilization for electoral 
support by candidates through public and private means is fairly common in many 
cases. Neither are village elections illusions of participation exploited by the ruling 
regime to signal political power. In the majority of cases, villagers are not compelled 
to vote and enjoy the freedom to vote for those they sincerely support. Observing 
these features, Landry and coauthors portray village elections as “competition without 
parties”.12  
  However, Chinese village elections still occur within a single-party polity 
and therefore face important structural restrictions. First, they are set up and promoted 
by the party-state mainly as an institutional tool to maintain stability rather than a 
sincere commitment to democracy.13 The historical origin of village elections can be 
traced back to the chaotic decade of the Cultural Revolution. which drastically 
undermined the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the grassroots 
level. As the People’s Commune system collapsed and the state’s control over rural 
communities weakened, the loss of legitimacy began to trigger extensive mass 
																																								 																				
12 Pierre F. Landry, Deborah Davis, and Shiru Wang, "Elections in Rural China: Competition Without 
Parties," Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 6 (2010): 763. 
13 Elizabeth Perry J. and Merle Goldman, "Introduction: Historical Reflections on Grassroots Political 
Reform in China," in Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China, ed. Elizabeth Perry J. and 
Merle Goldman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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discontent and disorder in the countryside. Meanwhile, the Party’s personnel control 
in the local area was also deteriorating. Many village officials were coming to doubt 
whether the benefits of being a village official exceeded the cost.14 Under such 
circumstances, how to rebuild public order and maintain the authoritarian rule in the 
countryside became a political imperative the central leaders of the country had to 
face. Realizing the problem, Chinese leaders decided to introduce competitive 
elections into rural communities, hoping that the partial devolution of political and 
policy-making power would protect the regime from the threat of eruptive social 
challenges.15  
  The second structural restriction village elections have been facing lies in the 
constant interference from local agents of the state. State officials, particularly at the 
township level, often seek to tailor the procedures, manipulate the processes and 
tamper the results of elections.16 They may directly nominate candidates and bluntly 
block the participation of candidates whom they regard as troublemakers. They also 
mobilize or even coerce party members to vote for government-sponsored candidates. 
In other cases, officials simply stuff the ballot boxes or change the votes secretly. 
Even if their favorite candidates lose the election, they may still declare the result 
invalid due to voting irregularities or illegal vote buying.  
  Local officials are motivated to intervene in village elections for a variety of 
causes, including pursuing private gains, promoting local economic and fiscal 
																																								 																				
14 Kevin J. O'Brien, "Implementing Political Reform in China's Villages," The Australian Journal of 
Chinese Affairs, no. 32 (1994). 
15 Xu Wang, "Mutual empowerment of state and peasantry: Grassroots democracy in rural China," 
World Development 25, no. 9 (1997). 
16 Thomas Bernstein, "Village Democracy and Its Limits," ASIEN 99(2006)	
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interests or fulfilling upper-level policy targets such as social stability.17 Any of these 
causes would require officials manipulating elections and placing people they trust to 
the positions of village leadership. Since the Organic Law fails to specify many 
institutional details regarding how elections should be held as well as the boundary of 
the role local authorities should play in them, plenty of room is left for township 
officials to intervene. Villagers may challenge electoral misconducts, but it is often a 
bitter road. In the absence of an independent judicial system, any suit against electoral 
fraud from villagers has to go through a long administrative process, which proves to 
be both painful and unpromising in practice.  
The coexistence of democratic features and authoritarian elements is 
constantly shaping voters’ attitudes toward the institution of elections and toward the 
regime. On the one hand, elections have greatly increased ordinary villagers’ political 
awareness and democratic consciousness. More and more villagers have come to 
believe that elections are the best way of selecting village leaders and exercising 
governance.18 On the other hand, fraud, corruption and scandals involving elections 
have been undermining villagers’ satisfaction with the local party-state as well as their 
confidence in the grassroots democratic institution itself. For example, some voters 
who have experienced electoral corruption tend to view elections as a game played by 
officials and village elites only and of no use for ordinary villagers. As a result, they 
																																								 																				
17 For a more detailed discussion on the motivations of local officials, see Birney, Mayling. 
"Decentralization and Veiled Corruption under China’s ‘Rule of Mandates’." World Development 
(forthcoming) and Su, Fubing, Ran Tao, Xin Sun, and Mingxing Liu. "Clans, Electoral Procedures and 
Voter Turnout: Evidence from Villagers' Committee Elections in Transitional China." Political Studies 
59, no. 2 (2011): 432-57. 
18 Wang, "Mutual empowerment of state and peasantry: Grassroots democracy in rural China." 
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may form stronger resentment to local authorities and pursue more contentious 
strategies to voice their discontent or demands. In the next section, I will review the 
relevant theoretical and empirical literature and propose two theoretical hypotheses 
regarding the impacts of elections on voters’ political attitudes for empirical tests. 
Evaluating the Political Impacts of Authoritarian Elections: Theoretical 
Hypotheses 
Under democracy, elections with greater procedural justice are often associated with 
stronger public support for the elected government. However, whether the same 
relationship also holds in an authoritarian context remains unclear in theory. One 
reason for this indetermination is that, unlike their democratic counterparts, 
authoritarian governments are often not restricted by the election they set up, or are 
able to sabotage effective electoral competition. Unsurprisingly, many scholars view 
authoritarian elections as no more than a self-legitimization process organized by 
dictators.19 Even in places where limited electoral competition among parties exists, 
authoritarian governments can easily achieve victory by relying on electoral fraud, 
vote buying and patronage networks.20 The rigged nature of authoritarian elections 
raises questions to their utility in inducing public support for the regime. 
Instead of viewing elections as a facade of representation, a recent strand of 
literature began to reexamine the role of elections in authoritarian regimes and to 
emphasize their implications for government policy and social welfare. One important 
																																								 																				
19 Merle Fainsod, How Russia is ruled, Rev. ed., Russian Research Center studies, (Cambridge, Mass.,: 
Harvard University Press, 1963); Richard Rose, "Learning to support new regimes in Europe," Journal 
of Democracy 18, no. 3 (2007). 
20 Lisa Blaydes, "Who Votes in Authoritarian Elections and Why? Determinants of Voter Turnout in 
Contemporary Egypt," Working paper (2006); Ellen Lust-Okar, "Elections under authoritarianism: 
Preliminary lessons from Jordan," Democratization 13, no. 3 (2006). 
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finding produced by this endeavor suggests that the need for mobilizing electoral 
support may push authoritarian rulers to hold at least limited downward 
responsiveness and accountability that may stabilize the authoritarian rule.21 The 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) of Mexico, for example, distributed public 
goods through the poverty relief program Pronasol to acquire electoral support.22 
Pepinsky found similar evidence in Malaysia.23 In Vietnam, congress delegates 
subject to local elections with free and fair procedures of nomination and vote are 
more likely to criticize authorities and more responsive to the needs of local 
constituents.24  
Village elections in China also provide support to the above functional view of 
authoritarian elections. Existing studies have related elections to better public goods 
and services, less administrative corruption and less government predation in Chinese 
villages.25 As a consequence, elections have to some extent improved the relationship 
between local state authorities and residents in rural China. Drawing on case studies 
and interviews, Schubert finds that voting in direct elections provides villages with a 
previously unavailable channel of political participation as well as some policy 
																																								 																				
21 Raj M. Desai, Anders OlofsgÅRd, and Tarik M. Yousef, "THE LOGIC OF AUTHORITARIAN 
BARGAINS," Economics & Politics 21, no. 1 (2009); Jennifer Gandhi, Political institutions under 
dictatorship  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
22 Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico. 
23 Thomas Pepinsky, "Autocracy, Elections, and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from Malaysia," Studies in 
Comparative International Development 42, no. 1/2 (2007). 
24 Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler, "Nodding or Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in 
an Authoritarian Parliament," American Political Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010).	
25 Birney, "China's Village Elections as a Mechanism for Political Stability Via Bounded Political 
Responsiveness."; Kennedy, Rozelle, and Shi, "Elected Leaders and Collective Land: Farmers' 
Evaluation of Village Leaders' Performance in Rural China."; Manion, "The Electoral Connection in 
the Chinese Countryside."; Manion, "Democracy, Community, Trust: The Impact of Elections in Rural 
China."; Shen and Yao, "Does grassroots democracy reduce income inequality in China?."; Monica 
Martinez-Bravo et al., "Do Local Elections in Non-Democracies Increase Accountability? Evidence 
from Rural China," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No. 16948(2011). 
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influence in their communities, which reduce villagers’ tendency to challenge the 
local state.26 In other words, village elections may become a layer of lubricant 
between the authoritarian state and the masses and thus protected the former from 
eruptive collective challenges.  
Beside policy and welfare consequences, elections also grant citizens of 
authoritarian countries limited political freedom. By organizing periodic elections, 
authoritarian rulers are able to present themselves as proponents of more fundamental 
and meaningful political reforms. Noting this, Schedler wrote: “by opening the peaks 
of state power to multiparty elections, electoral authoritarian regimes establish the 
primacy of democratic legitimation. . . regimes institute the principle of popular 
consent, even as they subvert it in practice.”27 Myanmar’s legislative election in 2010 
provides an illustrating case of the legitimacy-enhancing function of elections. Ang 
San Suu Kyi, the leader of the country’s largest oppositional party, encouraged 
opposition leaders to boycott the election because she believed participation by any 
opposition figures would lend legitimacy to a process that was designed to entrench 
the military regime of the country.28 Suu Kyi’s concern clearly reflects the potential 
utility of elections in boosting public support for authoritarian governments. 
The political rights and governance-improving effects associated with 
elections may boost ordinary citizens’ confidence in the ruling regime, despite the 
latter’s authoritarian nature. However, such an effect is conditional on the premise 
																																								 																				
26 Gunter Schubert, "Village Elections, Citizenship and Regime Legitimacy in Contemporary Rural 
China," in Regime Legitimacy in Contemporary China: Institutional Change and Stability, ed. Thomas 
Heberer and Gunter Schubert (London: Routledge, 2009).  
27 Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation," 13. 
28 “Suu Kyi Allies Plan to Take Myanmar Parliament Seats”, the Wall Street Journal, Nov, 17, 2010 
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that elections satisfy a minimal level of democratic standard and achieved an effective 
level of competition. In particular, the procedures, processes and results of elections 
should be free of interference from the ruling governments and politicians. 
Unfortunately, illegal manipulation by authoritarian rulers and their agents is a 
common practice in authoritarian elections, which would undoubtedly undermine the 
public confidence in the regime. Elections in Mexico under the PRI clearly illustrated 
the above argument. Before the early 1980s, the PRI was almost unchallenged in 
national and sub-national elections and the party’s main strategy was mobilizing 
electoral support using redistribution and state patronage rather than rigging elections. 
During this period, elections basically played the role of strengthening the 
hegemonic-party rule. However, things changed in the 1980s when unprecedented 
challenges from other political parties emerged. Facing these challenges, the PRI was 
forced to manipulate elections in favor of its own candidates. Although the Party 
successfully maintained its leadership in the 1988 presidential election, public 
confidence in it declined rapidly after the disclosure of a series of electoral frauds, 
which eventually led to its defeat in the following election. Interviews with Chinese 
rural residents also suggest that rigged elections have detrimental effects on villagers’ 
trust in not only village leaders but also the local authority. Experiencing electoral 
frauds often causes villagers’ discontent with the local government, particularly when 
local officials are also responsible for electoral misconducts. For example, one 
respondent in Jilin complained about the excessive inference of upper-level officials 
in village elections and asserted that these behaviors dramatically ruined the prestige 
13 
	
of the local government.29 Respondents in a village of Sichuan also expressed strong 
discontent with the township officials who vetoed their elected VC Chair, called for a 
reelection and eventually altered the electoral outcome.30 Based on the above analysis, 
I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (Trust Enhancing Effect): compared with manipulated ones, free and 
faire elections induce stronger public confidence in the authoritarian government. 
If authoritarian elections help incumbent rulers establish trust among citizens, 
do they necessarily hurt the latter’s democratic consciousness and therefore their 
preference for further democratization? My answer is no, because free and fair 
elections and the interest representation embedded in the institution can produce 
positive perceptions of democratic institutions among voters, which may contribute to 
the formation of democratic values in authoritarian societies. Existing studies have 
established two theoretical accounts for the positive effect of elections on citizens’ 
support for democracy. First, elections provide voters with the right to choose or oust 
public officials, to determine policies and to express themselves on political issues. 
This classic political freedom itself is an important merit voters may appreciate 
independent of the political and economic consequences of elections.31 Second, 
democracy requires a long learning process, in which repeated participation can 
deepen a person’s skills, interest, and efficacy and elevate his or her support for 
																																								 																				
29 Interview conducted in Jilin, September 2007 
30 Interview conducted in Sichuan, September 2008 
31 Evans and Whitefield, "The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for 
Democracy in Transition Societies." 
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democracy.32 While most works in this vein focus on transitioning countries, I 
believe both accounts also apply to authoritarian countries and to China in particular. 
In the past two decades, residents of Chinese villages participated in elections every 
three years, practiced how to nominate candidates and cast ballots, and learned how to 
use elections as a weapon to punish inadequate officials. This regular interaction with 
democratic institutions has remarkably promoted voters’ civil consciousness and 
political efficacy.33 In addition, elections also encourage villagers to pursue further 
democratic rights. After two decades of democratic training, some villagers now hope 
elections to be held for township and county governments.34 
 What voters can learn from elections also depends on the extent to which these 
elections are free of illegal intervention from non-democratic forces, especially the 
ruling elites of the authoritarian regime and their local agents. This is because while 
voters’ positive evaluation of electoral quality can boost their support for democratic 
institutions and encourage their participatory behaviors, unjust electoral procedures or 
outcomes will produce a negative perception of democracy among voters and erode 
their confidence in the representative political institution. Interviews with Chinese 
villagers confirm this argument. Dissatisfied with the election in his village, one 
villager stated “our election was such a mess… the former chair bought off electoral 
committee members and put every electoral procedure under his control, while others 
																																								 																				
32 Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton, "Learning about Democracy in Africa: Awareness, Performance, 
and Experience," American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 (2007); Rose, "Learning to support 
new regimes in Europe."	
33 Li, "The Empowering Effect of Village Elections in China."; O'Brien, "Villagers, Elections, and 
Citizenship in Contemporary China." 
34 Jamie P. Horsley, "Village Elections: Training Ground for Democratization," China Business 
Review 28, no. 2 (2001); Daniel Kelliher, "The Chinese Debate over Village Self-government," China 
Journal 37(1997).	
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had no chance of winning at all. I don’t think elections are suitable for us.”35 Clearly, 
unfair procedures and extensive frauds are ruining the perception of elections by 
Chinese rural residents. 
Hypothesis 2 (Democratic Training Effect): free and fair elections also increase 
voters’ support for democracy, while manipulated ones tend to undermine the public 
preference for the representative political institution. 
Combining the two effects, I argue that elections may simultaneously elevate 
public confidence in the regime and nurture a pro-democratic cultural environment. 
The experience of village elections in Sichuan provides an illustration of the dual 
effects and also facilitates the causal inference. As a vanguard of local political reform, 
Sichuan used to have high-quality elections at the village level from the late 1990s to 
the mid 2000s. During this period, reformists in the provincial government not only 
promoted village democracy; they also attempted to advance direct elections up to the 
township level.36 These reform initiatives triggered great enthusiasm from local 
residents, as demonstrated by villagers’ very active participation in local elections.37 
However, the development of grassroots democracy in Sichuan was reversed in late 
2005, when the Party center urged the Sichuan provincial Party committee to tighten 
control over local elections under the concern that too much liberalization might cause 
political instability.38 As table 3 shows, the quality of village elections in Sichuan 
experienced a significant deterioration between the two election years. Given this 
																																								 																				
35 Interview conducted in Hebei, June 2008. 
36 Lianjiang Li, "The Politics of Introducing Direct Township Elections in China," The China 
Quarterly 171(2002). 
37 Youxing Lang and Baogang He, "Buyun Dilemma: An Exploration of Direct Downship Elections in 
China [Buyun kunjing: Zhongguo xiangzhen zhang zhijie xuanju kaocha]," 21th Century [Ershiyi 
Shiji], no. 4 (2001). 
38 Interview conducted in Sichuan, July 2006 
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largely exogenous change, the Sichuan case therefore can be viewed as a 
quasi-experiment to explore the effect of elections on voters’ political attitudes. Our 
interviews in Sichuan suggested that voters displayed considerable discontent with the 
07/08 elections. Some complained about the increasing interference of township 
officials in village affairs compared with before, while others expressed low 
confidence over the utility of elections. One retired village official suggested that 
people in his village became less enthusiastic in participating elections; only a few 
villagers showed up to vote in the election while others simply asked others to vote on 
their behalf.39 Our 2008 survey also tentatively suggests that respondents in Sichuan 
province report a lower level of trust in local governments than three years ago.40  
Students of village elections have long noticed the complex impacts of the 
representative institution on voters’ political attitudes. For example, Landry and 
colleagues commented, “contested elections in authoritarian regimes may 
simultaneously strengthen demand for accountability and loyalty to the regime”.41 
Kennedy also made a similar argument.42 In the next section, I use survey data from 
114 Chinese villages to conduct a direct test of the two hypothesized effects. 
Statistical Analysis 
																																								 																				
39 Interview conducted in Sichuan, September 2008 
40 Lacking comparable measures in our 2005 survey, I cannot rigorously show that political trust and 
support for further democratization were decreasing during the period. However, just to provide one 
piece of tentative evidence, the 2005 survey did ask respondents whether they thought “township and 
county government policies truly care for the interest of peasants”. About 65% of the interviewees in 
Sichuan offered a positive response, while the proportion of trustful respondents in the 2008 survey 
was only 50%. 
41 Pierre F. Landry, Deborah Davis, and Shiru Wang, "Elections in Rural China: Competition Without 
Parties," Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 6 (2010): 763. 
42 John J. Kennedy, "Legitimacy with Chinese Characteristics: 'two increases, one reduction'," Journal 
of Contemporary China 18, no. 60 (2009).	
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The data I use to test the above hypotheses comes from a two-round nationwide 
survey conducted in 120 Chinese villages from six provinces in 2005 and again in 
2008 by the same research team. The survey employed a standard multi-stage 
clustered sampling method to select individual respondents (Appendix A describes the 
sampling process in greater details). In each round, the survey randomly selected three 
to five village officials and 25 ordinary villagers. Interviewers asked village officials 
to collectively recall the electoral procedures adopted in the most recent VC elections 
and then verify this information with selected villager respondents. For villagers, the 
survey collected information including their demographic characteristics, voting 
behaviors in recent elections and a wide range of political attitudes. Since the two 
rounds of the survey interviewed different sets of respondents, I only use the 
individual-level data from the 2008 survey, which enables me to use indicators of 
electoral quality in lagged terms. The two rounds of the survey overlap in 114 villages, 
resulting in a sample of 2272 villagers in the overlapping villages after invalid 
responses are eliminated.43 Thus, the data used in the following analysis represents 
the 2272 villagers from the 114 villages.  
Support for Democracy 
The dependent variable I use to capture the democratic training effect of elections is 
voters’ support for democracy. I measure this political attitude using the survey 
question “in your opinion, what is the best way to select local government leaders at 
the county and township levels.” The options are: 1=appointed by superiors; 2= 
																																								 																				
43 For reasons including weather and traffic conditions and thwart by the local mafia, the second round 
of the survey team failed to reach six villages visited in the first round. 
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indirectly elected by villagers’ representatives; 3=directly elected through popular 
elections.44 The order of these options reflects the strength of the respondent’s 
demand for further democratic reforms of the regime and thereby his/her support for 
democracy.45 
Asking respondents to choose their preferred methods to select county and 
township government leaders is an appropriate measure for villagers' support for 
democracy for two reasons.46 First, the indicator is constructed based on the two 
defining features of democracy, namely contestation for offices and universal 
suffrage.47 The value 1 indicates that the interviewed respondent supports neither 
electoral contestation nor public participation in the selection of local government 
leaders, while the value 3 indicates that he or she favors both. The value 2 represents 
																																								 																				
44 An “I don’t care” option is also included for respondents who are uninterested in politics. Since 
forcing these respondents to choose an answer may probably induce cursory responses, the survey 
allows respondents to choose not answering to reduce measurement error. For theoretical foundation of 
this treatment, see John Brehm, The phantom respondents : opinion surveys and political 
representation, Michigan studies in political analysis (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).	
45 Strictly speaking, administrative leaders and party secretaries at both the township and the county 
level are in principle subject to approval by local congress representatives. This approval process is 
non-competitive since only one candidate is nominated. However, some respondents may confuse the 
approval procedure with indirect elections by villagers’ representatives (value 2 of the dependent 
variable), depending on their political awareness and positions in local politics (e.g. local congress 
representatives). To address this concern, I also generate a binary variable in which direct elections by 
one person one vote equal one and all other options equal zero as the dependent variable. It turns out 
that this new approach does not change the main findings in any meaningful way. 
46 The indicator used here is different from those widely used in public opinion surveys in established 
democracies, such as ANES, or in surveys for cross-national comparison, such as the Barometer 
Surveys. For example, in the New Europe Barometer Surveys, respondents’ support for democracy is 
measured by the type of regime they perceive as most ideal for their own countries. Similarly, the 
World Value Survey asks respondents the extent to which they think democracy is a good way of 
governing their own countries. Although widely used in surveys in democratic contexts, the wording of 
these questions may be too abstract and ambiguous for Chinese villagers, who have little experience of 
democracy. In China, the CCP leaders and official media tend to frame the country's single-party 
regime as a “people’s democracy”, which may cause confusion in villagers’ understanding of 
democracy. For ordinary Chinese, the word “democracy (minzhu)” may have multiple interpretations, 
including liberal democracy, consultative leadership and benign autocracy. To avoid confusion, I use 
concrete survey questions to measure villagers' support for democracy. 
47 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy; participation and opposition  (New Haven,: Yale University Press, 
1971). 
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that the respondent supports contestation among candidates but opposes the extension 
of suffrage to all villagers. Second, township and county governments are the bottom 
tiers of China’s administrative hierarchy. Ordinary villagers may obtain knowledge of 
them through processes of policy implementation, social networks and even direct 
interactions with local officials. Due to this proximity, it is relatively easier for 
villagers to form rational and stable opinions about local authorities than higher levels 
of the government.  
Table 1 provides an overview of democratic support among respondents of the 
survey. Nearly half of the interviewees (48.3%) believe that direct elections are the 
best way to select local government leaders. In contrast, about one fourth of the 
respondents prefer indirect elections, while another 16 percent choose direct 
appointment by upper-level officials. Another 9 percent of respondents answer “don’t 
care”, probably suggesting that they are either uninterested in politics or cognitively 
incapable of making a choice.  
[Table 1 about here.] 
Political Trust 
The trust enhancing effect argues that free and fair elections also reinforce citizens' 
confidence in government. Using two questions, the survey asked respondents to 
evaluate local officials’ accountability and integrity as measures of political trust. The 
two questions are “do you agree that county and township officials truly represent and 
protect the lawful rights and interests of farmers?” and “do you believe in the integrity 
of county and township officials?” Both questions ask interviewees to choose a value 
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from 1 to 5, in which the value 5 represents strongly agree while the value 1 denotes 
strongly disagree.  
Overall, the survey result suggests that respondents’ confidence in local 
governments is not very high (Table 2). For both indicators, about half of respondents 
agreed that they trust country and township authorities, while 26 to 32 percent of 
respondents clearly expressed some levels of distrust. These proportions are close to 
those reported by other surveys, which also lends support to the validity of our 
measures.48 I aggregate the two trust indicators using the following approach. First, 
by combining the two positive responses and also the two negative ones, I transform 
each trust indicator to one with the three values of trust (+1), neutral (0) and do not 
trust (-1). Then I add the two transformed indicators up to construct a composite trust 
index, which ranges from -2 to 2. 
[Table 2 about here] 
A Procedural Measure of Election Quality 
The key explanatory variable of this research is the quality of the two most 
recent rounds of village elections, held in 2004-2005 and 2007-2008 respectively. I 
adopt a procedural measure of election quality.49 More specifically, I use the 
																																								 																				
48 Lianjiang Li, "Political Trust in Rural China," Modern China 30, no. 2 (2004); Li, "Distrust in 
Government Leaders, Demand for Leadership Change, and Preference for Popular Elections in Rural 
China." 
49 To be sure, fair and transparent procedures do not guarantee that elections are clean, let alone that 
elected officials will exercise power in a meaningful way, for example, see Kevin J. O'Brien and 
Rongbin Han, "Path to Democracy? Assessing Village Elections in China," Journal of Contemporary 
China 18, no. 60 (2009). Local authorities can adopt many other strategies to manipulate election 
outcomes without explicitly distorting the procedures. However, given that direct interference in 
procedures is still a common phenomenon in village elections, I believe the fairness and transparency 
of procedures to some extent still capture the overall quality of these elections. See Melanie Manion, 
"How to Assess Village Elections in China," Journal of Contemporary China 18, no. 60 (2009); Gunter 
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following three criteria to evaluate the representativeness, fairness and transparency 
of electoral procedures: 1) the openness of the candidate nomination process to 
ordinary voters, 2) the relative autonomy of the electoral process from interference by 
local governments and the ruling party and 3) the degree to which the voting process 
is insulated from electoral fraud. These procedural criteria are widely discussed in 
existing studies and regarded as essential to the overall fairness and transparency of 
village elections.50 
Following the first criterion, the indicator of candidate nomination is coded as 
one for elections adopting “open sea nomination” and as zero otherwise.51 “Open sea 
nomination” refers to a nomination process that each eligible voter receives a blank 
nomination ballot and writes down the name of the most preferred candidate he or she 
chooses from all adult villagers. This nomination method could reduce the 
arbitrariness of the candidate selection process and guarantees that only those who 
obtain sufficiently strong support from villages are eligible to compete in the final 
stage.  
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 													
Schubert, "Studying ‘Democratic’ Governance in Contemporary China: Looking at the Village is not 
Enough," Journal of Contemporary China 18, no. 60 (2009). 
50 Birney, "China's Village Elections as a Mechanism for Political Stability Via Bounded Political 
Responsiveness." Kennedy, Rozelle, and Shi, "Elected Leaders and Collective Land: Farmers' 
Evaluation of Village Leaders' Performance in Rural China."; Robert Pastor and Qingshan Tan, "The 
Meaning of China's Village Elections," China Quarterly, no. 162 (2000); Manion, "Democracy, 
Community, Trust: The Impact of Elections in Rural China."; Fubing Su et al., "Clans, Electoral 
Procedures and Voter Turnout: Evidence from Villagers' Committee Elections in Transitional China," 
Political Studies 59, no. 2 (2011). 
51 Other nomination methods adopted in village elections include: nomination by villagers' small 
groups (cunmin xiaozu), nomination by villager or household representatives, nomination by party 
members, incumbent VC members or party branch members and nomination by township officials. As 
my fieldwork suggests, these nomination methods only involve a small number of participants, 
therefore are more likely to be manipulated or controlled by local officials or other social forces. 
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  Second, I use an ex post indicator to gauge the relative autonomy of the 
electoral process from interference by local officials. The survey recorded whether 
township authorities explicitly intervened in the election by nominating candidates, 
directly appointing village leaders from final candidates or, in extreme cases, calling 
off the election. The indicator of interference takes the value one for elections without 
explicit township intervention and zero for manipulated ones. Third, I use whether the 
use of roving ballot boxes was prohibited to measure the transparency of the voting 
process. Since roving ballot boxes are often more difficult to monitor than fixed ones, 
using them to collect votes is more vulnerable to electoral frauds. For example, roving 
ballot boxes may induce unauthorized proxy voting behaviors, or even allow plotters 
of electoral fraud to stuff ballot boxes directly. Thus, prohibiting roving ballot boxes 
reduces undesirable interference and increases the transparency of the voting process.  
  Table 3 summarizes the quality of elections in sample villages by province 
and also by election year. Overall, election quality displays considerable variation 
across regions. For example, more than 90 percent villages in Jilin province adopted 
"open sea nomination" in the 2007/2008 election year. The proportion is 100 percent 
for "no township interference" and 71 percent for "no roving ballot boxes". In 
comparison, elections in Fujian province are poorer in fairness and transparency. Only 
ten percent villages prohibited the use of roving ballot boxes while not a single village 
nominates candidates by “open sea nomination”. Quality of procedures also varies by 
time. In the 2007/2008 election year, election quality improved in some villages, 
while deteriorated in others. The most notable case of deterioration occurred in 
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Sichuan province. Quality of both ballot box and township interference dramatically 
decreased. Many factors may contribute to the regional and temporal variations of 
electoral quality. For example, as discussed earlier, the decrease in Sichuan’s election 
quality was mainly caused by provincial mandates to tighten the control over elections. 
A thorough discussion on the logic behind these variations is beyond the scope of this 
paper. To examine the attitudinal effects of these variations, I add up the three 
procedural indicators to form a composite index of election quality. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Statistical Models 
I use two ordered probit models to test the two hypothesized effects of village 
elections. The dependent variables are villagers’ trust in local governments and their 
support for democracy respectively. The key independent variable of both models is 
the quality of the most recent election in a village. I also put political trust on the right 
hand side of the second model to examine the indirect impact of election quality on 
support for democracy through political trust.52  
Both models also seek to control theoretically important variables at both 
individual and village levels. Besides elections, performance of local governance may 
also shape villagers’ trust in local governments. I use three variables to capture 
governance performance. First, a binary variable is generated to indicate whether the 
respondent experienced forceful land requisition by local governments in the past 
																																								 																				
52 Li studies the relationship between political trust and support for democracy among Chinese 
villagers. His analysis suggests that political distrust leads to stronger support for democracy rather 
than the other way around. Following his approach, this research also puts political trust as the 
explanatory variable in the model of support for democracy. For more details, see Li, "Distrust in 
Government Leaders, Demand for Leadership Change, and Preference for Popular Elections in Rural 
China." 
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three years. In recent years, land requisition has become a pervasive phenomenon in 
rural China and has caused numerous disputes between governments and farmers. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that land requisition undermines villagers’ trust in local 
authorities. The second performance variable is the total amount of fees levied by 
local governments in the year before the survey. While villagers have been exempted 
from the duty to pay formal agricultural taxes, some local governments still levy 
various types of administrative and resource fees, which increase villagers’ burdens. I 
argue that fees have a negative impact on villagers’ trust in local governments. Finally, 
village-level investment on public goods and services in the year before the survey is 
also controlled. Since village expenditure on public goods and services mostly relies 
on fiscal input by local governments, I expect more public investment to increase 
villagers’ political trust.  
The model also controls a series of individual characteristics, including age, 
education, gender, party membership, and village official status. Modernization 
theory asserts that income may affect individual’s political attitudes. Unfortunately 
the survey did not collect household or individual income, thus I use village average 
income per capita as a rough substitute. Respondents’ participatory behaviors (i.e. 
whether they voted or not in the most recent election) may also play a role. For 
example, Landry and coauthors write that “casting a ballot, observing how ballots are 
counted, and seeing whether the most vote getters are actually confirmed as election 
winners all shape individual perceptions of electoral fairness decisively”.53 I expect 
																																								 																				
53 Landry, Davis, and Wang, "Elections in Rural China: Competition Without Parties." 
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vote participation to simultaneously increase political trust and support for democracy. 
Table 4 provides a detailed summary for all control variables.54  
A Note on Endogeneity and the Instrument Variable (IV) Approach 
Although using objective measures for election quality can mitigate the 
potential endogeneity problem, possibility still exists that the observed relationships 
are driven by causal mechanisms other than the hypothesized ones. For example, one 
may argue that democratic-minded villagers may block government interference and 
promote freer and fairer elections. Or alternatively, both electoral procedures and 
villages’ political attitudes can have common but unobserved determinants, including 
but not limited to, village history, political culture and personal characteristics of 
incumbent village cadres. Or villagers that trust the government might be trusted by 
the government and thus be allowed cleaner elections. 
The paper employs two empirical strategies to facilitate causal inference, thus 
providing more corroborating evidence for the hypothesized causal mechanisms. First, 
I use the lagged independent variable, namely the quality of the 2004/2005 elections, 
to attenuate the temporal simultaneity between the independent and dependent 
variables. Since the villages’ political attitudes are measured three years after the 
2004/2005 elections, it is less likely the case that political attitudes today affect past 
electoral procedures. However, the causal inference problem still exists if certain 
																																								 																				
54 The above models control township fixed effects and report village-clustered standard error. Beside 
these baseline models, I also estimate three sets of alternatively specified models to establish the 
robustness of the result. First, I estimate a hierarchical model to control the random unobserved effects 
at the village level. Second, I use a multiple imputation method to fill in the missing values and “do not 
know” responses. Last, since the survey employed a multistage clustered sampling method, I also use 
sample weight to adjust for sampling effects. Results for these robustness checks are reported in 
Appendix B.	
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factors affect both electoral quality and political attitudes. Given this concern, I 
further adopt an instrument variable (IV) approach to facilitate causal inference. 
The instrument variable used for the election quality of a sample village is the 
average quality of elections in the other counties of the same province.55 The election 
quality of a sample village is correlated with the average quality of other counties in 
the same province because provincial governments often issue stipulations and 
directives about procedures to be used in all villages of the province. Although the 
extent to which these directives are strictly implemented in the actual elections vary 
case by case, procedures adopted in elections within a province does manifest some 
resemblance.56 The correlation coefficient between the instrument and the 
instrumented is 0.45 for 2007/2008 and 0.40 for 2004/2005. Moreover, it is more 
reasonable to assume the exogeneity of the instrument variable given the fact that it is 
constructed using information from other counties.57 
Results and Discussions 
Table 5 and Table 6 report the estimation results of the two models. The first two 
columns of both tables use data from voters only, while the last two columns use all 
																																								 																				
55 All individual-level control variables are excluded from the first stage regression since there is little 
theoretical reason to believe that these demographic variables affect electoral procedures. 
56 For example, the provincial government of Jilin explicitly issued a file in 2007 to promote the "open 
sea nomination" method in its jurisdiction. As a result, 19 out of 21 sample villages in the province use 
this nomination method in the subsequent election. Similarly, Fujian explicitly permitted using roving 
ballot boxes because it could ease the voting process and increase turnout rates in the mountainous 
province. As a consequence, only two out of 19 villages in our sample did not use roving ballot boxes 
in the election and the proportion is much lower than in other provinces. 
57 The selected instrument variable should satisfy a critical condition, namely, the instrument variable 
should affect the dependent variable only through the instrumented independent variable. In this 
research, the quality of elections in a village should not affect political attitudes of villagers in other 
counties. In theory, such effects might exist, but they should be not detrimental since the selected five 
countries in each province are all non-adjacent, therefore villagers in the sample county should have 
little knowledge about the average quality of elections in other counties. Nevertheless, I admit the 
potential limitations of the instrument variable and claim it only useful for suggestive rather than 
conclusive causality inferences. 
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respondents, including both voters and non-voters. I make this distinction to see 
whether the hypothesized effects of elections are stronger among voters than 
non-voters. However, since only 10 percent of respondents did not vote in the most 
recent election, analyzing non-voters independently faces the problem of a small 
sample size. Thus instead of using non-voter sample only, the last two columns of 
both tables combine voters and non-voters and control their voting behaviors (i.e. a 
vote variable to indicate whether the respondent voted or not) for a rough comparison. 
[Table 5 and 6 about here.] 
  Overall, these results confirm both the trust enhancing effect and the 
democratic training effect. As the two tables show, elections with higher quality are 
associated with more confidence in local governments but also stronger support for 
democracy. As expected, the effects are slightly greater for the voter sample. In 
addition, quality of past elections also demonstrates a strong and significant impact, 
suggesting that the two hypothesized effects are persistent and stable. The effects of 
past elections also show that political trust and support for democracy may have 
undergone a gradual evolution process, in which both recent events and historical 
experiences play a role. Substantively, the marginal effect of the electoral quality 
index on political trust is between 0.14 and 0.21. In other words, one unit increase in 
electoral quality can boost individual trust by 0.14 to 0.21 units.58 The marginal 
effect of electoral quality on support for democracy is between 0.07 and 0.1. At a first 
glance, both effects seem to be small in magnitude. However, electoral quality is a 
																																								 																				
58 I calculate the marginal effect based the ordinary least square model rather than the order probit 
model to make interpretation more straightforward.   
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village-level variable, which means one unit increase of electoral quality would lift 
the average trust level of all villagers by 0.14 to 0.21 units. This effect is non-trivial 
given the fact that the standard deviation of the average trust level across villages is 
0.5 and the standard deviation of the average support for democracy is 0.2, as the data 
shows.  
The coefficients on the vote variable also lend support, at least indirectly, to 
the hypothesized arguments. In average, voters display both greater political trust and 
democratic support compared with non-voters, suggesting that voting in elections may 
also shape villages’ political attitudes. However, the finding should not be 
overemphasized for two reasons. First, the empirical evidence seems weak. The vote 
variable is only marginally significant in Table 5 and Table 6 and becomes 
insignificant in models with other specifications. Second, it is also possible that 
individual voting behaviors are simultaneously affected by the dependent variables of 
the model, namely, political trust and support for democracy. Without additional 
identification strategies, it will be difficult to establish the direction of the causality. 
  Among control variables, two of the three governance performance variables 
are consistent with earlier predictions, although the impact of village public 
investment per capita is only marginally significant. Land requisitions by local 
governments exert a negative influence on political trust with a marginal effect 0.5, 
the greatest impact among all independent variables in the trust model. This result 
confirms the scholarly observation that land requisitions have become a serious threat 
to social stability and regime popularity in today’s China. Investment on public goods 
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and services increases villagers’ confidence in local authorities. Finally, fees paid by 
respondents have insignificant impact on political trust, though the direction of such 
impact is in line with the hypothesis.  
  Demographic factors also matter. Trust level is higher among older 
generations than younger ones, which reflects a declining trend of trust in local 
governments among Chinese villagers. In addition, political trust is lower among male 
and more educated respondents. This is probably because these people have more 
political efficacy and therefore less susceptible to the ideological propaganda of state 
controlled media. Finally, CCP members and incumbent village officials tend to trust 
local authorities more than ordinary villagers. 
  Table 6 also shows that political trust is negatively correlated with support 
for democracy, suggesting that more trusting people have stronger support for the 
current regime and less demand for systemic change.59 The negative correlation 
between political trust and support for democracy adequately illustrates the dilemma 
of autocrats, namely, while authoritarian rulers prefer stronger regime support and 
less social demand for democratic transitions, elections cannot simultaneously serve 
the two goals. Free and fair elections do induce regime support, but the precondition 
is that the regime is willing to keep its promise of further democratic reform since 
elections have taught citizens to embrace the competitive political institution. Among 
other possible accounts of villagers’ support for democracy, age and education are 
																																								 																				
59 This result is consistent to the finding of existing studies. For details, see Li, "Distrust in 
Government Leaders, Demand for Leadership Change, and Preference for Popular Elections in Rural 
China." 
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statistically significant. Compared with older generations, younger villagers have 
higher support for democracy. An unexpected result comes from the variable of 
education. Contrary to the predication of modernization theory, I find that more 
educated people have significantly less support for democracy. Combining this with 
the previous result that education has a negative impact on political trust, I find that 
more educated villagers tend to be dissatisfied with the incumbent government but 
unwilling to change the status quo. Average income per capita does not increase 
villagers’ support either. One tentative reason for the failure of modernization theory 
in the context of rural China is that more educated people and economic elites in 
authoritarian societies are also the primary beneficiaries of the ruling regime. As such, 
they should have lower incentives than ordinary people to call for a change. In any 
case, a rigorous test of this logic requires further research. 
  The instrument variable approach provides further evidence for the 
hypothesized causal directions (Table 7). However, it needs to be pointed out that the 
potential drawbacks of the selected instrument variable may limit its validity. 
Moreover, other causal mechanisms may still apply, given the complex interactions 
among quality of elections, political trust and support for democracy both in theory 
and in reality. 
Autocrats’ Dilemma: A Concluding Remark on Authoritarian Elections 
A majority of authoritarian regimes in the world hold competitive national or local 
elections, an institution conventionally regarded as the defining feature of democracy. 
It remains an ongoing debate whether elections are simply a manifestation of existing 
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power relationships or are playing an independent role in shaping the political 
interaction among the ruling elites of the regime. However, few studies have 
systematically examined the role of authoritarian elections from a public opinion 
perspective. Drawing on the experience of village elections in China, this paper 
analyzes the potential impacts of elections on ordinary people’s trust in the 
authoritarian government and their support for democratic institutions. Using different 
modeling strategies, the empirical analysis of this paper consistently finds that free 
and fair village elections simultaneously increase Chinese people’s political trust and 
their support for democracy. This result is compatible with the recent scholarly 
discussion about the political impacts of village elections on China’s state-society 
relationship from the voter’s perspective.60  
The findings of this paper may shed lights on the resilience and breakdown of 
authoritarian regimes. By establishing an image of trustworthiness for the 
authoritarian government, competitive and representative institutions may allow 
authoritarian rulers to lift regime popularity and to some extent muffle the breakout of 
social discontent. One implication of this finding is that liberalized authoritarian 
regimes may not be inherently unstable per se, since liberalization policies themselves 
could serve as a safety valve to protect the authoritarian rule. 
However, authoritarian elections may also introduce some uncertainty to the 
ruling regime. This is because the legitimacy-enhancing role of elections requires the 
authoritarian government to set up relatively free and fair electoral procedures, allow 
																																								 																				
60 Kennedy, "Legitimacy with Chinese Characteristics: 'two increases, one reduction'."; Landry, Davis, 
and Wang, "Elections in Rural China: Competition Without Parties." 
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for genuine electoral competition and grant voters at least limited political rights. As 
the experience of PRI in Mexico suggests, although government sponsored candidates 
may gain short-term advantages in the race by manipulating the rules and processes of 
elections, opposition parties and social groups can still exploit the opportunity of 
liberalization to pursue authentic political clout and even the central leadership. In 
China, competitive elections at the village level have not yet achieved any political 
influence strong enough to shake the monolithic rule of the single-party regime. 
Nevertheless, they have provided a training ground for voters to learn the merits of 
the representative political institution. Villagers who have gone through this positive 
training are demonstrating a greater demand for the extension of competitive elections 
into higher governments. In this sense, the democratic training local elections have 
offered may gradually contribute to the formation of a relatively liberal and 
democratic culture.  
The dual effects suggest that authoritarian elections should not be viewed as 
the “Lid of Pandora’s Box” that unleashes irreversible regime changes.61 They are 
neither a window-dressing for authoritarian rulers to build a harmless facade of 
democracy. For those authoritarian regimes that adopt liberalizing policies to appease 
social discontent but concerned with the potential backfiring consequences of them, 
competitive elections may constitute a dilemma. They need to make a prudent choice 
between sponsoring the election and rigging it, balancing how much to gain and how 
much to lose. And the choice they make and its succeeding impacts might shape the 
																																								 																				
61 Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an age of democratization  (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
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political landscape of their regimes. Even in the Chinese context where elected local 
officials seems to pose no direct and immediate threats to the ruling Party, opening 
free and fair local elections may trigger greater demand for further empowerment 
among citizens. Such demand, as the work of Bruce Gilley suggests, may raise the 
question of whether the Communist Party should revise its norms and institutions in 
favor of sharing more political power.62  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
62 Bruce Gilley, "The Limits of Authoritarian Resilience," Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003). 
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Table 1: Statistical Description of Support for Democracy 
What is the best way to selection township 
and county government leaders 
Percentage (N=2272) 
 
Elected though popular elections (3) 48.02 
Elected by representatives (2) 25.53 
Appointed (1) 15.49 
I don’t care 8.45 
Non-response 2.49 
1. Data source: 2008 survey; 
2. Entries may not add up to 100 due to rounding errors. 
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Table 2: Statistical Description of Political Trust 
Trust in local governments 
Percentage (N=2272) 
Accountability  Integrity 
Very much (2) 19.76  11.05 
Somewhat (1) 33.54  39.13 
So-so (0) 12.41  17.25 
Not quite (-1) 19.15  17.91 
Not at all (-2) 12.24  8.10 
Non-response 2.91  6.55 
1. Data source: 2008 survey; 
2. Entries may not add up to 100 due to rounding errors. 
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Table 3: Quality of Elections by Province and by Election Year (N=114) 
 Proportion of Sample Villages Satisfying Democratic Criteria 
 Jiangsu Sichuan Shaanxi Jilin Hebei Fujian 
2007/2008 election       
Open Sea Nomination 32% 17% 38% 91% 40% 0% 
No Interference 84% 22% 63% 100% 65% 70% 
No Roving Ballot box 47% 56% 25% 71% 40% 10% 
2004/2005 election       
Open Sea Nomination 58% 11% 19% 86% 35% 0% 
No Interference 96% 83% 75% 95% 60% 60% 
No Roving Ballot box 47% 78% 25% 62% 40% 5% 
Number of Villages 19 18 16 21 20 20 
1. Data source: 2005 and 2008 surveys; 
2. Entries may not add up to 100 due to rounding errors. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 
Variable 
# of 
Obs. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Individual level       
Age (year) 2272 50.1 11.5 19 87 
Education (year) 2272 6.2 3.3 0 16 
Gender 2272 0.6 0.5 0 1 
Village Cadre  2272 0.1 0.3 0 1 
CCP Member 2272 0.1 0.3 0 1 
Land Requisition 2272 0.1 0.3 0 1 
Village level      
Fees (Yuan) 2272 356.1 2340 0 73500 
Village Public Investment per capita (Yuan) 2272 6.7 12.6 0 72.73 
Village Average Income per capita (Thousand 
Yuan) 
2272 4 2.3 0.2 13 
1. Data source: 2008 survey. 
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Table5: Explaining Political Trust 
 Political Trust (-2-2) 
 Voters Only All Respondents 
Election Quality (07/08) 0.134**  0.121**  
0-3 (0.06)  (0.05)  
Election Quality (04/05)  0.163***  0.137*** 
0-3  (0.06)  (0.05) 
Vote   0.144* 0.138* 
1=yes; 0=no   (0.08) (0.08) 
Fee (log) -0.007 -0.008 -0.005 -0.006 
Yuan (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Public Investment (log) 0.014 0.013 0.018* 0.018 
Yuan (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Land Requisition -0.287** -0.284** -0.266** -0.262** 
1=yes; 0=no (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Age 0.007** 0.007** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education -0.029*** -0.028** -0.024** -0.023** 
Year (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Gender -0.284*** -0.281*** -0.251*** -0.250*** 
1=male; 0=female (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Cadre 0.132 0.123 0.090 0.085 
1=yes; 0=no (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
CCP Member 0.168* 0.178** 0.155** 0.160** 
1=yes; 0=no (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
Village Income per capita (log) 0.074 0.138 0.050 0.109 
Thousand Yuan (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Cut-off point 1 -0.801*** -0.508* -0.606** -0.367 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.24) (0.25) 
Cut-off point 2 -0.499* -0.206 -0.306 -0.067 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.24) (0.25) 
Cut-off point 3 0.042 0.336 0.258 0.497** 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.24) (0.25) 
Cut-off point 4 0.449* 0.742*** 0.654*** 0.893*** 
 (0.27) (0.28) (0.24) (0.26) 
Number of observations 1670 1670 1867 1867 
1. Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses;      
2. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
3. Fixed effects at the township level are controlled but omitted from the table. 
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Table 6: Explaining Support for Democracy 
 Support for Democracy (1-3) 
 Voters Only  All Respondents 
Political Trust -0.059*** -0.059***  -0.049*** -0.049*** 
-2-2 (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Election Quality (07/08) 0.106***   0.107***  
0-3 (0.04)   (0.04)  
Election Quality (04/05)  0.163***   0.167*** 
0-3  (0.03)   (0.04) 
Vote    0.166* 0.158* 
1=yes; 0=no    (0.10) (0.09) 
Age -0.012*** -0.012***  -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Education -0.034*** -0.033***  -0.028*** -0.027*** 
Year (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Gender 0.009 0.012  0.020 0.022 
1=male; 0=female (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) 
Cadre -0.109 -0.118  -0.124 -0.131 
1=yes; 0=no (0.09) (0.09)  (0.08) (0.08) 
CCP Member -0.051 -0.041  -0.060 -0.054 
1=yes; 0=no (0.09) (0.09)  (0.09) (0.09) 
Village Income per capita (log) -0.039 0.013  -0.056 -0.001 
Thousand Yuan (0.12) (0.11)  (0.10) (0.09) 
Cut-off point 1 -1.730*** -1.427***  -1.480*** -1.174*** 
 (0.27) (0.27)  (0.26) (0.27) 
Cut-off point 2 -0.842*** -0.538**  -0.594** -0.286 
 (0.26) (0.26)  (0.25) (0.26) 
Number of observations 1670 1670  1867 1867 
1. Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses;      
2. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
3. Fixed effects at the township level are controlled but omitted from the table.    
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Table 7: Results for the Instrument Variable (2SLS) Model, All Respondents 
 All Respondents 
 Political Trust 
 Support for 
Democracy 
Electoral Quality (07/08) 0.167**  0.057* 
0-3 (0.07)  (0.03) 
Political Trust   -0.027** 
-2-2   (0.01) 
Vote 0.166  0.091 
1=yes; 0=no (0.11)  (0.06) 
Fee (log) -0.005   
Yuan (0.01)   
Public Investment (log) 0.016   
Yuan (0.01)   
Land Requisition -0.426***   
1=yes; 0=no (0.14)   
Age 0.010**  -0.007*** 
 (0.00)  (0.00) 
Education -0.031**  -0.016** 
Year (0.01)  (0.01) 
Gender -0.292***  0.012 
1=male; 0=female (0.08)  (0.04) 
Cadre 0.098  -0.074 
1=yes; 0=no (0.10)  (0.05) 
CCP Member 0.195**  -0.035 
1=yes; 0=no (0.10)  (0.06) 
Village Income per capita (log) 0.066  0.021 
Thousand Yuan (0.15)  (0.08) 
Constant -0.072  2.708*** 
 (0.33)  (0.16) 
R-square 0.099  0.046 
N.  1867  1867 
1. Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses;       
2. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
3. The instrument variable is the average quality of elections in other counties of the sample province 
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Appendix A: Survey Design 
The survey data used in the paper comes from a two-round survey of village elections 
conducted in six provinces in 2005 and 2008. To obtain a representative sample, the 
survey team adopted the following procedures: We first divided the country into six 
major geographical regions, and from each region randomly selected one province: 
Fujian, Hebei, Jiangsu, Jilin, Shaanxi, and Sichuan were the sample provinces. Below 
the provincial level, we adopted a multistage random sampling approach. More 
specifically, we first ranked all counties of each province according to their industrial 
output value and selected five counties out of the list using the systematic sampling 
method. Then we randomly chose two townships from each sample county and two 
villages from each sample township. At the villager level, 25 households were 
randomly selected from the official household registration list provided by village 
accountants.63 Then in each household we randomly chose one interviewee from all 
adult family members. One interviewer went to his or her family to conduct the 
interview and to fill out a standardized questionnaire including demographic 
information of all family members and subjective questions to be answered by the 
selected interviewee.  
The survey also collected information on sample villages, including their 
socioeconomic conditions and the electoral procedures adopted in village elections. 
Specifically, the survey team interviewed one of the three leading cadres, namely 
																																								 																				
63 Our planned sample size in each village was 20. However, considering possible non-responses (e.g. 
not at home, health problems etc.), we sampled 25 villagers in each village to guarantee that about 20 
individual samples can be obtained. 
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party secretary, villagers’ committee chairman or village accountant to gather village 
socioeconomic information. Then a group of three village elites, often prestigious 
villagers, electoral committee members or candidates of the most recent elections, 
was interviewed together. They were asked to recall the specific procedures adopted 
in the elections. Based on their description, interviewers filled out a standardized 
questionnaire to record how elections were conducted. In cases when village elites 
gave conflicting answers, we separately asked a few ordinary villagers to describe the 
electoral procedures for the purpose of cross-validation. 
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Appendix B: Some Robustness Checks for the Results 
This appendix tests models with alternative specifications as robustness checks for the 
above findings. First, since both dependent variables contain some “don’t know” and 
missing responses, I employ a multiple imputation approach based on the assumption 
that the data is missing at random (MAR). Ten imputed data sets are generated using 
an Expected Maximization (EM) algorithm. Then each data set is independently 
analyzed and the estimates are combined into a final result (Table B1). Second, the 
model includes explanatory variables at both individual and village levels, therefore it 
could only control fixed unobserved effects at the township level. Given this concern, 
I estimate a hierarchical model to simultaneously control both township fixed effects 
and village random effects (Table B2).64 Third, since the survey adopted a 
multi-stage cluster sampling method, I use a model that adjusts for the sampling 
design by adding sample weights and calculating clustered standard errors (Table B3). 
The sample weight assigned to each individual respondent is the reciprocal of the 
probability of this individual being selected according to the sampling design. Overall, 
these models report very similar results with the baseline model, suggesting the main 
findings of the paper are highly robust.  
[Table B1-B3 about here] 
 
 
																																								 																				
64 Andrew Gelman and Jennifer Hill, Data analysis using regression and multilevel/hierarchical 
models, Analytical methods for social research (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). 
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Table B1: Results for the Multiple Imputation Model 
 All Respondents 
 Political Trust  Support for Democracy 
Election Quality (07/08) 0.087*   0.089**  
0-3 (0.05)   (0.04)  
Election Quality (04/05)  0.091**   0.115*** 
0-3  (0.04)   (0.04) 
Political Trust    -0.052*** -0.052*** 
-2-2    (0.02) (0.02) 
Vote 0.104 0.102  0.149 0.146 
1=yes; 0=no (0.08) (0.08)  (0.09) (0.09) 
Fee (log) -0.006 -0.007    
Yuan (0.01) (0.01)    
Public Investment (log) 0.023** 0.022**    
Yuan (0.01) (0.01)    
Land Requisition -0.257** -0.253**    
1=yes; 0=no (0.10) (0.10)    
Age 0.007** 0.006**  -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Education -0.020** -0.019**  -0.026*** -0.025** 
Year (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Gender -0.240*** -0.237***  0.004 0.008 
1=male; 0=female (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) 
Cadre 0.090 0.085  -0.138* -0.144* 
1=yes; 0=no (0.08) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) 
CCP Member 0.157** 0.160**  -0.067 -0.062 
1=yes; 0=no (0.08) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) 
Village Income per capita (log) 0.105 0.144*  -0.048 -0.007 
Thousand Yuan (0.08) (0.07)  (0.09) (0.09) 
N. 2272 2272  2272 2272 
1. Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses;       
2. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
3. Fixed effects at the township level are controlled but omitted from the table. 
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Table B2: Results Adjusted for Survey Design 
 All Respondents 
 Political Trust  Support for Democracy 
Election Quality (07/08) 0.178***   0.088***  
0-3 (0.06)   (0.03)  
Election Quality (04/05)  0.154**   0.146*** 
0-3  (0.06)   (0.04) 
Political Trust    -0.055** -0.055** 
-2-2    (0.02) (0.02) 
Vote 0.200* 0.195*  0.134 0.131 
1=yes; 0=no (0.11) (0.11)  (0.12) (0.12) 
Fee (log) -0.010 -0.012*    
Yuan (0.01) (0.01)    
Public Investment (log) 0.024** 0.027**    
Yuan (0.01) (0.01)    
Land Requisition -0.340*** -0.321**    
1=yes; 0=no (0.13) (0.13)    
Age 0.006 0.006  -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Education -0.031** -0.030**  -0.022 -0.022 
Year (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Gender -0.319*** -0.313***  0.035 0.037 
1=male; 0=female (0.08) (0.08)  (0.10) (0.10) 
Cadre 0.123 0.118  -0.093 -0.096 
1=yes; 0=no (0.13) (0.13)  (0.09) (0.09) 
CCP Member 0.310*** 0.304***  -0.067 -0.070 
1=yes; 0=no (0.10) (0.10)  (0.11) (0.11) 
Village Income per capita (log) -0.021 0.069  -0.095 -0.044 
Thousand Yuan (0.08) (0.07)  (0.09) (0.08) 
N.  1867 1867  1867 1867 
1. Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses; 
2. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
3. Fixed effects at the township level are controlled but omitted from the table.     
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Table B3: Results for the Hierarchical Model 
 All Respondents 
 Political Trust  Support for Democracy 
Electoral Quality (07/08) 0.121**   0.107**  
0-3 (0.05)   (0.05)  
Electoral Quality (04/05)  0.137**   0.167*** 
0-3  (0.06)   (0.06) 
Political Trust    -0.049** -0.049*** 
-2-2    (0.02) (0.02) 
Vote 0.144* 0.138  0.166* 0.158* 
1=yes; 0=no (0.09) (0.09)  (0.09) (0.09) 
Fee (log) -0.005 -0.006    
Yuan (0.01) (0.01)    
Public Investment (log) 0.018* 0.018    
Yuan (0.01) (0.01)    
Land Requisition -0.266*** -0.262***    
1=yes; 0=no (0.09) (0.09)    
Age 0.007*** 0.007***  -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
Education -0.024** -0.023**  -0.028*** -0.027*** 
Year (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
Gender -0.251*** -0.250***  0.020 0.022 
1=male; 0=female (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06) 
Cadre 0.090 0.085  -0.124 -0.131 
1=yes; 0=no (0.09) (0.09)  (0.09) (0.09) 
CCP Member 0.155* 0.160*  -0.060 -0.054 
1=yes; 0=no (0.08) (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) 
Village Income per capita (log) 0.050 0.109  -0.056 -0.001 
Yuan (0.09) (0.09)  (0.10) (0.09) 
N.  1867 1867  1867 1867 
1. Standard errors clustered at the village level are in parentheses;       
2. * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
3. Township fixed effects and village random effects are controlled but omitted from the table. 
     
 
 
 
 
 
